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THE G20 IS NOT JUST A G7 WITH EXTRA CHAIRS1
AGNÈS BÉNASSY-QUÉRÉ, RAJIV KUMAR AND JEAN PISANI-FERRY,SEPT 2009
IN THE WAKE OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS the G20 has
largely substituted the G7 as the key forum for
international economic cooperation. However, G7
and non-G7 members of the G20 come to G20
meetings with different priorities. Developed
countries have taken a direct hit on their banking
and financial systems as a result of the crisis and
they accordingly give priority to strengthening
financial regulation and supervision. Emerging
economies have been primarily affected by the
collapse of trade and (mostly in emerging Europe)
the outflow of capital. Their priority is thus to ward
off the reemergence of protectionism in trade and
finance. As newcomers, the emerging countries
are also focused on the distribution of power and
they adamantly claim that they need more say in
international institutions. So far, the G20 agenda
has been dominated by the management of the
global turmoil, the provision of financial resources
to countries in crisis, and the rebuilding of
financial regulation – a rather G7-like agenda.
Meanwhile, it has been silent on the issue of global
imbalances, where it could have made a
difference. In the future, the G20’s agenda will
have to evolve and better reflect the variety of
concerns of its members. 
THE PARADOX OF THE G20
A striking outcome of the global financial crisis
has been the acknowledgement that global
coordination needs to be handled by a wider group
than the traditional G7, which only brings together
advanced economies. Indeed, while the crisis
clearly originated in the (perhaps too)
sophisticated banking sectors of the advanced
economies, it rapidly grew into a global one
through the collapse of trade and of commodity
prices and through the sudden reversal of capital
flows to several emerging and developing
countries. Some of the countries hit hardest by
the crisis are emerging economies, especially in
Europe. 
The creation of the G20 recognises that inter-
dependence cannot be managed by developed
countries alone and that non-G7 countries should
have a say both in the design and in the
management of the global economic and financial
system. In recent past the developing world was
invited to the top table when development issues
were on the agenda. This time it has been given
permanent seats and has been asked to
participate in the solution of a global problem. This
fundamentally changes the nature of the
discussion2. The meeting of G20 leaders is
symbolic in this regard, but the same applies to
other bodies: emerging economies have also been
invited to be represented in other formerly
exclusive institutions where financial regulation
is made, such as the Basel Committee and the
Financial Stability Board. This is a game change in
international governance.
Still, both G7 and non-G7 members of the G20 may
not yet have entirely realised that the G20 is not
just an extended version of the G7. Its agenda has
so far been determined by the urgent responses
needed to tackle an unfolding crisis whose
epicentre was located in the US. Hence, the
creation of the G20 has not yet served to shape
the international discussion. This is what could be
1. This paper draws on the
discussion among par-
ticipants at the Bruegel-
ICRIER-CEPII conference
on ‘International Cooper-
ation in Times of Global
Crisis: Views from G20
countries’ held in New
Delhi on 14-15 Septem-
ber, 2009. We are grate-
ful to Olena Havrylchyk
for coordinating a first
draft of this document
with Dony Alex, Mathew
Joseph and Hélène
Vuillermet. We would
also like to thank Man-
meet Ahuja, Chantal
Bartholin and Arpita
Mukherjee for their key
roles in the conference.
All references without
details refer to papers or
presentations discussed
during the different ses-
sions and can be found
at the following link:
http://www.economiein-
ternationale.eu/anglais-
graph/communications/
pdf/2009/14150909/1
4150909.htm
(accessed 21 September
2009).
2. As observed by Montek
Singh Ahluwalia (Deputy
Chairman of the Indian
Planning Commission)
in his remarks at the
opening of the
conference.G7
Other advanced
Non-G7 G20
Others
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called ‘the paradox of the G20’. 
For example, the outcome of the G20 finance
ministers’ meeting of London (4-5 September
2009) is much more specific on financial
regulation and remuneration, which mainly
concern G7 countries, than on other issues that
interest most emerging ones – trade liberalisation
and the reform of Bretton-Woods institutions. But
this is to a large extent because emerging
countries have not yet produced consistent
proposals on how they want to use their new
responsibilities in international governance. Trade,
global imbalances, and the reform of global
financial institutions are three cases in point:
i Emerging countries have suffered most from
the fall in international trade during the crisis,
but the bulk of tariff hikes have come from
emerging and developing, rather than from
developed, economies3;
ii Economic growth in emerging economies relies
heavily on global growth, but given that
consumers in Anglo-Saxon countries are bound
to save more and spend less, global growth will
itself depend on how East-Asian countries
manage to rebalance their growth models;
iii Discussion on reform of the Bretton-Woods
institutions is still confined to the admittedly
important question of quotas and voting rights,
while the bigger issue of their role in the
prevention of crisis and the acceptance of
corresponding encroachments on national
sovereignty remains highly sensitive,
especially in Asia4. 
Consistently, G20 communiqués are rather vague
on trade, almost silent on global imbalances, and
noticeably unspecific on the surveillance role of
the IMF.
Additionally, G20 leaders should acknowledge the
fact that, like the G7, the G20 will not be the
appropriate configuration forever. Indeed, while
many people speculate about when China will
overtake the US as the leading global power, little
attention is paid to the fact that Africa is forecast
to overtake China, as well as India, in terms of
population by 2030. More strikingly, the size of its
young population is already almost equal to that
of China or India, while Africa also accounts for a
large share of land and natural resources available
globally5. The G20, however, includes six European
countries (the four G7 ones, Russia and Turkey)
plus two semi-official ones (the Netherlands and
Spain), three Latin American countries (Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico), but only one African country
(South Africa). It will need to evolve in the future to
better represent this region of the world.
THE NEW RULES OF GLOBAL FINANCE
The urgency of strengthening the regulation and
supervision of financial-market institutions was
highlighted in the first two G20 meetings in
November 2008 and in April 2009. Over the last
few months, a large number of academic papers,
official reports and white papers have been
published in the US and in Europe, and
international organisations have also contributed.
Much less, however, has come from the non-G7
G20 countries, not least because their
participation in global financial integration is
much more limited: the G7 countries and other
advanced economies account for the bulk of
cross-border holdings of assets and liabilities, and
the non-G7 G20 countries for a mere 10 percent
(Figure 1).
Figure 1: World distribution of external assets
and liabilities*, 2007
* Total assets + total liabilities. G20 excluding the
Netherlands and Spain. Source: authors’ calculations using
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti data.
3. As of 1 March 2009,
about 78% of all trade and
trade-related measures
have been announced by
developing countries. See
Peter Draper (South African
Institute of International
Affairs), ‘Cross-border trade
and emerging
protectionism’.
4. Shigeo Kashiwagi (Policy
Research Institute,
Japanese Ministry of
Finance), ‘Don’t let
globalization go into
reverse’.
5. Jean-Joseph Boillot
(CEPII’s Business Club,
Paris and Euro-India
Economic Business Group),
‘Economic Balance of
Powers after the crisis’.THE G20 IS NOT JUST A G7 WITH EXTRA CHAIRSBénassy-Quéré, Kumar, Pisani-Ferry
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While non-G7 countries are now fully fledged
members of the bodies in charge of setting the
rules of global finance, they have not yet clarified
their own priorities. Some suggest that the global
rules should be set ‘for Nanos instead of Ferraris’6.
But some of the emerging countries’ banks and
financial institutions are an integral part of
financial globalisation. If a distinction needs to be
made, it is not between countries but between
global and local players.   
For the time being, however, rules are being set by
the G20 but at the initiative of advanced
countries. 
The agenda starts with capital requirements and
accounting, whose pro-cyclicality has been widely
viewed as having considerably deepened the
financial crisis, since they incited banks to sell
assets and cut credit, which aggravated solvency
problems through the fall in asset prices and the
drying up of some markets. Consistently, the G20
has been considering not only raising capital
requirements for ‘systemic’ financial institutions
but also introducing counter cyclical capital or
reserve buffers. As for mark-to-market accounting,
a number of politicians, notably in France, have
called for accounting standards reform, insisting
that ‘market’ value is not always ‘fair’ value, and
have expressed support for model-based or
historical-cost accounting. The argument behind
this stance is that the first approach makes sense
from the point of view of idiosyncratic risk in
stable conditions, but it may be far from optimal
when viewed from a systemic viewpoint. However,
advanced countries should learn from historical
experience, including that of emerging countries
here: the lesson from most previous crises is that
non-transparent balance sheets tend to deepen
the crisis, due to late recognition of problems, and
to unnecessarily delay the recovery.
Consequently, many economists propose to
continue relying on fair-value accounting, while
applying filters to mitigate the pro-cyclicality of
accounting standards, or supplementing them
with stress-testing exercises that would provide
more long-term views of solvency7. 
Next comes the scope of financial regulation and
supervision, which is widely regarded as having
been inadequate. This concerns not only
institutions that were unregulated and non-
transparent such as hedge funds but, more
importantly, the most regulated of all financial
institutions – banks! The key point here is that
banks escaped capital regulation by using off-
balance-sheet special investment vehicles (SIVs)
to buy asset-backed securities while financing
these investments mostly through short-term
asset-backed commercial paper. However, the
corresponding risk was not transferred since
banks extended guarantees to their SIVs, or even
held asset-backed securities while transferring
their loans to SIVs in order to reduce in-balance-
sheet risk. In short, this is as if banks themselves
had bought asset-backed securities (ABSs), but
without respecting the corresponding capital
requirements. When in the wake of the crisis the
short-run funding dried up, ABSs (now called ‘toxic
assets’) were transferred back to banks’ balance
sheets (where capital requirements apply),
leading to a sudden undercapitalisation of the
banking sector and to the subsequent disruptions
in financial markets8. This clearly demonstrates
that failure to regulate the ‘shadow’ banking sector
is at the root of the crisis. 
However, regulatory arbitrage will always exist
and banks may find other gaps in order to escape
regulation. Fighting such arbitrage will necess-
itate close coordination between supervisors both
within and between countries and an incentive
device to make each country resist reaping gains
from allowing financial institutions to expand
through regulatory gaps – which makes the G20 a
much better forum than the G7. 
‘Advanced countries should learn from experience, including that of emerging countries: the
lesson from most previous crises is that non-transparent balance sheets tend to deepen the
crisis, due to late recognition of problems, and to unnecessarily delay the recovery.’
6. Andrew Sheng
(University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur), ‘Political
consequences of the
economic profession:
G20 and the emerging
markets’.
7. Nicolas Véron (Bruegel,
Brussels),  ‘Accounting
Standards and Financial
transparency’.
8. Viral Acharya (NYU, USA,
with Matthew
Richardson), ‘Causes of
the financial crisis’.THE G20 IS NOT JUST A G7 WITH EXTRA CHAIRSBénassy-Quéré, Kumar, Pisani-Ferry
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One possibility would be not just to regulate
institutions, but rather activities, so that capital
can be put aside for credit risk whether it is
located on the balance sheet or off. Another option
would be to switch from home-country to host-
country regulation and supervision. This would
require banks to operate through subsidiaries
rather than branches, with each subsidiary
regulated and supervised by the host country. An
additional advantage of such an  approach would
be to allow each host country to engineer macro-
prudential supervision in line with its own credit
cycle.
A third micro-prudential issue on the G20 agenda
is the dangers that are posed by ‘too-big-to-fail’
institutions such as Lehman Brothers. Ironically,
the crisis has spurred mergers and acquisitions
that have led to an even larger number of
systemically important institutions whose
activities are spread over numerous countries.
One way to deal with this issue, proposed by the
US Treasury, is to apply stricter and more
conservative prudential standards for these
institutions in terms of capital and liquidity ratios
and risk-management standards. Another
possibility, proposed by Lord Turner from the
Financial Services Authority in the UK (FSA), is to
force the biggest banks to pre-plan their own
demise by writing ‘living wills’. This should not
only make bank resolutions easier and faster but,
in planning their own resolution, banks would be
encouraged to better track their exposures and
might eventually simplify their legal structures. As
with the question of supervisory scope, tackling
‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions is hampered by the
willingness of national governments to attract
financial activities and to promote national
champions. 
WHAT MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION?  
The debate on macroprudential supervision is
quite different since there was no macro-
prudential supervision before the crisis (although
this is not a new concept). It is increasingly
accepted that financial stability cannot be
provided by the combination of monetary policy
and time-invariant capital requirements. Now that
both the EU and the US have made moves in this
direction, the question is what role macro-
prudential supervision will play in the policy
regime. 
G20 leaders have agreed to consider
countercyclical capital requirements, which would
ensure that banks build buffers in good times that
they can draw down when conditions deteriorate,
and the Financial Stability Forum, the Basel
Committee on Bank Supervision and the
Committee on the Global Financial System have
been charged with devising a framework for this
by the end of 2009. The problem is how to
determine when times are ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and who
is in charge of this task. On the ‘how’ question, a
number of methods have been proposed, such as
the use of ‘through-the-cycle’ internal ratings
(already suggested by the FSA and advised by the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors),
autoregressive adjustment of capital, as well as
using a multiplier to adjust capital, which could
depend on lending growth, credit spreads, GDP
growth, or asset prices9. However, research has
shown that none of these measures performs
perfectly as each crisis is different in nature. This
lack of consensus suggests that one should not
rush to devise a rule-based approach, but rather
experiment with constrained discretion - have
principles but leave room for discretionary
decisions. This can also be viewed as a learning
process10.
On the ‘who’ question, there is still no broad
consensus either. The best-equipped institution to
define ‘good’ and ‘bad’ times would be the central
bank of each country. However, this would imply
departing from the existing framework where
many central banks have a single instrument (the
interest rate) and a single target (consumer-price
stability). More importantly, the interconnection
between macrofinancial supervision and bank
bail-outs (which have strong fiscal implications)
could put central bank independence at risk.
The need for the above reforms is widely
recognised in developed economies, even though
9. Avinash Persaud (Capital
Intelligence, London),
‘Macro-Prudential
Regulation: Fixing
Fundamental Market (and
Regulatory) Failures’.
10. Olena Havrylchyk
(CEPII, Paris), ‘Comments
on Avinash Persaud and
Sylviana Vatnick’.G7
Other advanced
Non-G7 G20
Others
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opinions differ on the depth and details of
implementation. However, the G20 may not have
taken into account the views of emerging
economies. The introduction of higher and
countercyclical capital requirements would
probably increase the cost of financial
intermediation. While this cost is justifiable in
countries with deep financial markets in order to
achieve financial stability, emerging economies –
with a significant share of the population still
excluded from banking markets – would prefer a
differential country-by-country approach. Finally,
counter cyclical credit policies may prove tricky in
open, emerging countries where credit tightening
in a boom may be offset by a rise in capital
inflows.
GLOBAL IMBALANCES
Global imbalances are a G20 topic because unlike
gross capital flows, which mostly go North-North,
net flows of savings go both North-North and
South-North. Significantly, 35 percent of total
current-account surpluses and deficits are
accounted for by G7 countries and 38 percent by
non-G7 G20 countries (Figure 2).
Figure 2: World distribution of absolute current
account balances*, 2012
* Sum of absolute values of current account balances. G20
excluding the Netherlands and Spain. Source: IMF.
There is no consensus among economists on the
role played by global imbalances in the crisis.
Some claim that the excess of saving over falling
investment in East Asia is one important reason
why long-term interest rates were so low for so
long, encouraging leverage, pushing house prices
up and giving incentives to asset managers to
seek high-yield products11. Some object that while
US macroeconomic conditions were indeed
conducive to the crisis, they were fundamentally
determined by domestic developments. Further-
more, they observe that the US current-account
deficit as a proportion of world GDP actually
diminished from 2005 to 200812.
Nevertheless, there is broad consensus that the
current situation is not optimal for a number of
reasons. First, global imbalances have played a
role in the transmission of the crisis across
borders: emerging economies with large current-
account deficits, for example in central and
eastern Europe, have been more vulnerable to
reversals of capital flows. Second, imbalances
reflect domestic problems and distortions, such
as a lack of social insurance and poor corporate
governance coupled with financial repression (as
is the case in China) and low private savings (as
is the case of the US and the UK). Third, they may
constitute an obstacle to a sustained recovery of
global growth in a context where failing US
consumption needs to be replaced. Finally, to the
extent that imbalances are financed through
liquid capital flows, they are a potential source of
disruptive adjustments.
Although there seems to be some agreement that
global imbalances need to be reduced, the ‘how’
question is much debated, which may explain the
reluctance of the G20 to make clear statements
on this issue. In particular, it is difficult to imagine
how a double-rebalancing of growth, from the
public to the private sector and from deficit to
‘Although there seems to be some agreement that global imbalances need to be reduced, the
‘how’ question is much debated, which may explain the reluctance of the G20 to make clear
statements on this issue.’
11. See David Vines (Oxford
University and CEPR),
‘The Financial Crisis,
Global Imbalances, and
the International
Monetary System’.
12. See Gian-Maria Milesi-
Ferretti (IMF, with Olivier
Blanchard), ‘Global
Imbalances:  Past,
Present and Future’, and
Ted Truman (Peterson
Institute for Inter-
national Economics,
Washington),
‘Comments on Milesi-
Ferretti and Vines’THE G20 IS NOT JUST A G7 WITH EXTRA CHAIRSBénassy-Quéré, Kumar, Pisani-Ferry
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surplus countries, could be achieved without
significant real exchange-rate adjustments. The
US advocates a further appreciation of the
renminbi, but Chinese experts are puzzled by the
fact that the 2005 decision to move to gradual
appreciation was in fact followed by a rise in the
country’s external surplus13. Furthermore, China
fears that an appreciation of the renminbi could
trigger a massive capital loss on its accumulated
reserves in US dollars. However, a gradual
appreciation of the renminbi may not be advisable
either since it could trigger speculative capital
inflows into China. All in all, there will be an
interconnection in China between, on the one
hand, monetary reforms (currency convertibility,
making the exchange rate more flexible,
liberalising capital flows) and, on the other,
structural ones (allowing banks to extend loans
according to credit rather than political criteria,
accelerating the provision of safety nets,
discouraging excess capacity, cutting export
subsidies...).
The US has long been blaming China for its
undervalued currency, threatening to raise tariffs
on Chinese exports if China does not revalue hard.
Unfortunately, China has suffered very much from
the nose-dive in international trade and has
endured rising protectionism, especially from
Europe and the US14. This is not to encourage the
Chinese authorities to do a U-turn in their growth
and monetary strategies. But, more generally, the
way advanced economies deal with domestic
protectionist temptation in the face of growing
unemployment will be key to encouraging East-
Asian countries to remove distortions in favour of
their tradable sectors. 
REFORM OF THE IMF
As already mentioned, one key driver of global
imbalances has been the accumulation of foreign-
exchange reserves by some emerging countries,
particularly China. The rationale for this is either
foreign-exchange intervention or self-insurance
against balance-of-payment crises – a major
motivating factor for many small and medium-
size countries, especially in Asia where trust in the
International Monetary Fund was severely
undermined by the experience of the late 1990s.
The softer and more flexible conditionality recently
adopted by the IMF in central and eastern Europe
is widely regarded as resulting from a change in
the IMF’s approach to crises. But it can also be
interpreted – and is indeed interpreted by some –
as resulting from Europe having a greater stake
than Asia in the governance of the Fund. 
Large accumulation of reserves for self-insurance
purposes can be considered inefficient both from
the point of view of the country that accumulates
reserves (it sterilises resources that could be
invested more productively) and from a global
macroeconomic standpoint (countries aiming to
accumulate reserves they seek to save more,
which dampens global demand). Alternative
arrangements, such as the establishment of credit
lines, reserve-pooling arrangements, swap lines
or other forms of insurance are therefore
preferable. The G20 decision (in April 2009) to
increase IMF resources to 750 billion US dollars
points to a push to enhance the role of the IMF as
a lender of last resort. Moreover, the establishment
of the Flexible Credit Line can be viewed as giving
it the role of ‘lender of first resort’. But this is
unlikely to convince Asian countries to return to
the Fund unless IMF governance undergoes in-
depth reform. This is where macroeconomic
reform meets reform of the Bretton-Woods
institutions.
A second reason to reform IMF governance is to
improve its ability to carry out effective bilateral
and multilateral surveillance. As regards the
former, Financial Sector Assessment Programmes
had been conducted neither in the US nor in China
13. He Fan (CASS, Beijing),
‘Comments on David Vines
and Gian-Maria Milesi-
Ferretti’.
14. Min Tang (China
Development Research
Foundation, Beijing),
‘Emerging Trade
Protectionism: A Case in
China’, Natalya Volchkova
(New Economic School and
Center for Economic and
Financial Research,
Moscow), ‘Cross-Border
Trade and Finance:
Emerging Protectionism’.
‘The US has long blamed China for its undervalued currency, threatening to raise tariffs on
Chinese exports. But China has suffered very much from the nose-dive in international trade
and has endured rising protectionism, especially from Europe and the US.’THE G20 IS NOT JUST A G7 WITH EXTRA CHAIRSBénassy-Quéré, Kumar, Pisani-Ferry
08
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
prior to the crisis. As regards the latter, the
Multilateral Consultations of the mid-2000s are
considered promising by some, pointless by
others but effective by no one. Furthermore, the
attempt to revive exchange-rate surveillance has
been a failure. In fact, effective policy assessment
requires both independence and legitimacy. A way
to increase the independence of surveillance
could be to relieve the Executive Board of its
surveillance duties and to focus it on the overall
strategy of the Fund. But to raise the legitimacy of
the Fund requires more fundamental change.
Output legitimacy (in the handling of the tasks
assigned to the institution) is important but it is
no substitute for enhancing input legitimacy
through a significant shift of voting rights and
executive power away from Europe to emerging
and developing countries15. Furthermore, these
changes should go hand in hand with a reduction
of the 85 percent-majority threshold, which
currently gives the US a power of veto, and with at
least partial consolidation of the European chairs. 
In this respect the creation of the G20 is likely to
have profound implications. Having gained a seat
at the top table, emerging and developing
countries cannot continue to accept a minor role
in the Bretton-Woods institutions. Neither can
they be satisfied with insubstantial  changes and
a promise that more will happen in the future.
Gradualism was a possible reform strategy in the
pre-crisis world. It is no longer an option.
15. Louis Pauly (Toronto
University), ‘Crisis,
Collaboration, and
Confidence: The Global
Economy and the Future
of the Bretton Woods
Institutions’, and
comments by Stormy-
Annika Mildner (German
Institute for
International and
Security Affairs (SWP)),
and Shigeo Kashiwagi
(Policy Research
Institute, Japanese
Ministry of Finance).